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Preface
The SEC Practice Section was founded in 1977 as a voluntary
organization o f CPA firms striving for professional excellence in the
auditing services they provide to Securities and Exchange Commis
sion (SEC) registrant companies. It is part o f the Division for CPA Firms
o f the American Institute o f CPAs (AICPA) — the national professional
association o f almost 300,000 CPAs in public practice, industry, gov
ernment and education — and is overseen by the Public Oversight
Board.
The Section (or the "SECPS") imposes membership requirements
and administers two fundamental programs to assure that SEC regis
trants are audited by accounting firms with adequate quality control
systems: (1) peer review, through which Section m embers have their
practices reviewed every three years by other accountants, and (2)
quality control inquiry, through which allegations o f audit failure con
tained in litigation filed against m em ber firms are reviewed to deter
mine if the firms' quality control systems require corrective measures.
The Public Oversight Board-(the "POB" or "Board") is an autono
mous body consisting o f five members with a broad spectrum o f
business, professional, regulatory and legislative experience. The
Board's primary responsibility is to assure that the public interest is
carefully considered when (1) the SECPS sets, revises and enforces
standards, membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2)
the Section's committees consider the results o f individual peer re
views and the possible implications o f litigation alleging audit failure.
To preserve its independence and objectivity, the Board appoints its
own members, chairman and staff, and establishes its own com pen
sation and operating procedures.
The accounting profession’s self-regulatory programs are remark
ably effective in ensuring quality audits. However, no m ethod o f
regulation can prevent human failure, and occasional breakdowns
occur. In the event o f an audit failure, injured parties and regulatory
agencies take steps to identify and punish those responsible. And it is
the role o f the self-regulatory system to assure that corrective actions
are taken to prevent further harm.
i

The self-regulatory system should be better understood both by
people who perform audits and by those who rely on "auditors' re
ports." The Board has published this monograph to facilitate under
standing o f the heretofore most confidential and controversial aspect
o f the self-regulatory process — the inquiry into alleged audit failures
by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee. We believe the present
structure o f the profession s self-regulatory process cannot b e fully
understood without a knowledge o f QCIC’s history. This monograph
provides that history.

ii

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The AICPA Division for CPA firms and its programs and require
ments are the invention o f the AICPA membership, a self-regulatory
program for which that membership can take great credit. But an im
portant part o f that self-regulatory program, the Quality Control In
quiry Committee (originally named the Special Investigations Com
mittee), is one for which the membership cannot take sole credit.1
Establishing an investigatory process to review allegations o f audit
failure held the possibility o f increasing the firm's risk o f unsuccessfully
defending its perform ance in litigation proceedings and thus quite
properly concerned members o f the profession. It is questionable
whether the leadership o f the profession could have succeeded in
establishing such a process without outside support. In any event,
that leadership turned to the independent Public Oversight Board for
assistance in the task.
As early as March 1978, when the POB first met, the SEC Practice
Section Executive Committee asked the Board to consider the follow
ing issues: whether m em ber firms should be disciplined in the event
o f audit failure, and, if so, whether disciplinary action should proceed
when litigation is threatened or pending. The POB studied these ques
tions in depth, exploring the numerous related issues with legal counsel
and with leaders o f the profession. The Board's influence proved cru
cial. Much impressed by then POB Vice-Chairman Ray Garrett's anal

1The committee's name was changed by the SECPS Executive Committee at its
December 6, 1988 meeting, because the former name was considered misleading.
An investigatory committee is generally perceived as intended to pass judgment on
events and the responsibility for them. That was never intended to be the primary
mission o f this committee which is and always has been to gain assurance in the
light o f adverse allegations whether a firm's quality control system is adequate and
being complied with. Hence, the name, "Quality Control Inquiry Committee," more
appropriately describes this mission, nevertheless, at times in this monograph we
refer to the committee as the Special Investigations Committee (the "SIC" ), be
cause throughout most of the evolving history o f the committee it was called by
that name. We recognize the confusion this may cause readers, but because the
original name of the committee contributed significantly to the difficulty som e firms
faced in working with the committee, we have used Special Investigations Committee
(SIC) and Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) interchangeably.
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ogy to governm ent investigation o f airplane accidents, the Board
proposed that the emphasis be on remedy when reviewing the alle
gations o f audit failure rather than on punishment. This was a turning
point in rallying the necessary support o f the profession to establish
the Special Investigations Committee and its operating charge.
Out o f the POB's extensive deliberations em erged somewhat more
com plex conclusions. First, the public would be best served if the
Section's emphasis were on prophylactic or remedial measures than
on punishment. Second, a permanent com m ittee (the Special Inves
tigations Committee) should be form ed to inquire into the implica
tions o f alleged audit failures to determine whether specific remedial
measures directed to the individual auditors or their firm were neces
sary, and whether auditing standards and supporting literature should
be revised. Third, the committee should proceed with its inquiries
promptly regardless o f any possible impact on litigation. Fourth, in
egregious cases, the com m ittee might inquire into responsibility for
audit deficiencies and recom m end appropriate punishment to the
executive committee. It is surely not too much to say that the POB's
participation and moral force brought the SIC into existence more
quickly and in m ore decisive form than could otherwise have been
possible.
Those involved in the POB's activities at that time recall that al
m ost everyone concerned viewed the prospect o f SIC actions with
trepidation. On the one hand was the fear that the com m ittee might
do too little and thereby appear ineffective, bringing criticism to the
entire self-regulatory effort. If credibility with the SEC and Congress
were lost, the possible results could be most unfortunate. Yet an overly
zealous com m ittee could do much damage to the best interests o f
firms in litigation without contributing anything substantial to the public
interest.
In the words o f one o f those associated with the process from
the beginning:
From my own vantage point, I look back with amazement at what
has been accomplished. A carefully thought out approach was
developed after much consultation and consideration of all views.

Introduction
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Then, responsible men struggled with the day-to-day SIC process
under the scrutiny and frequent comments o f the FOB and its
staff. Changes were made and procedures were tightened up. But
our worst fears did not come to pass. Instead, an institutionalized
procedure has developed and been accepted as a fair and practi
cal balance of interests, notwithstanding the slowness of the SEC
to recognize it. In my view, it is a major achievement and both the
public and the profession have been well served.

This brief monograph describes the process and som e o f the
events by which the Special Investigations Committee o f the SEC
Practice Section was founded, developed, and accepted by the pro
fession and the public.

Purpose o f this M onograph
At the time o f this writing, the com m ittee seem s solidly estab
lished. It is now accepted by most m em ber firms as an integral part
o f the self-regulatory program, and is well thought o f by those rela
tively few who are familiar with its activities. Why then trouble our
selves to write or read this brief history o f the Quality Control Inquiry
Committee? A number o f reasons com e to mind.
Perhaps most important to us is our conviction that the Section's
self-regulatory program is still in a process o f development. Efforts to
improve that program are continuing and significant. Lest those who
are not familiar with its history mistake legitimate attempts at im
provement for criticisms o f its effectiveness, or attempt modifications
o f the present program that are out o f character with its purpose and
experience, we think it well to memorialize that experience while it is
still fresh in m em ory so it can be reviewed as a basis for further con
structive experimentation.
Also, w e believe that heroes should be recognized. The early
m embers o f the com m ittee were faced with som e extremely difficult
assignments and occasionally their activities were view ed by many
with skepticism and by som e with acrimony. The first chairman o f the
QCIC, Rholan E. Larson, provided the capable leadership the commit
tee needed at its inception. The names o f those who served with him
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are listed in the Appendix. Mr. Larson was succeeded by equally com 
petent chairmen, Robert A. Mellin and William D. Hall. The aforemen
tioned appendix also includes the names o f all the mem bers o f this
com m ittee from inception through the date o f the writing o f this
monograph. Each m em ber o f that com m ittee in his own way contrib
uted directly to the success o f the com m ittee's work; each o f them
served his profession well. Without general recognition or compensa
tion, yet for the love o f their profession and with a strong belief that
the public was entitled to the best the profession could offer, they
carried on, persevering in a task they had not asked for nor desired.
In the larger picture, the Special Investigations Committee and
its evolution constitute a revealing exam ple o f how a profession,
brought face to face with a problem it had not previously recognized,
can adopt a solution, test it, try it, and ultimately make it work. The
accounting profession was not too proud to accept both criticism and
counsel. On the other hand, it was not so short o f confidence or talent
that it would swallow any medicine prescribed without considering
the consequences. In that spirit, the accounting profession experi
mented with, complained about, gradually realized the importance
of, becam e accustomed to, and has finally accepted the Quality Control
Inquiry Committee.
The evolution o f the Special Investigations Committee into the
present Quality Control Inquiry Committee is a demonstration o f how
good men o f strong and divergent views can, by a combination o f
events, personalities, necessity, and the passage o f time, work out a
process that serves them and others well. The profession had legitimate
concerns and fears. These were dealt with in a sensitive fashion and
largely overcom e by persistent and thoughtful effort over a number
o f years by those involved, the chairmen and mem bers o f the SEC
Practice Section Executive Committee, AICPA staff, special Institute
review committees, house counsel for a number o f the larger firms,
the POB and the SEC.

Introduction
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Threads Running Through the QCIC's Evolution
Tw o threads run throughout the history o f the Special Investiga
tions Committee, and that history is m ore understandable if one is
aware o f these. The first is a continuing contest between two conflicting
forces: (1) the necessity o f providing for the public interest which
demanded that the reason for "audit failures" be immediately identi
fied and eliminated; (2) the importance to accounting firms o f a vigor
ous defense against litigation arising out o f alleged audit failures and
a fear that the actions o f the Special Investigations Committee would
jeopardize that defense. The attempt to balance these two forces
continues to this day.
The second thread also involves a contest and is related to the
first. Critics o f the accounting profession argue that regulation means
discovery, identification, and punishment o f those who fail to serve
the public interest. Those responsible for faulty audits must be iden
tified and punished, and that should b e the role o f the Special Inves
tigations Committee.
The profession's contention has been to the contrary. It holds
that the legal system is peculiarly qualified and equipped to deal with
fault and punishment. The most important contribution the Special
Investigations Committee can make is to investigate plaintiff's alle
gations to determine if they indicate weakness in the defendant firm's
system o f quality control. If they do, attention should then be turned
to remedying those weaknesses. The best way to serve the public
interest is to eliminate weaknesses in quality control so future audits
will better serve their purpose. Punishment is a matter for the courts
to deal with.
A third but much less important thread can also be distinguished.
When the SIC was first proposed, the emphasis was on litigation in
cases so important that the public becam e aroused and confidence
in independent auditing suffered. Thus any cases that received sub
stantial and continuing media attention should b e investigated by the
Special Investigations Committee. A somewhat different point o f view
was raised by those more interested in audit quality than in m edia
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attention. "An audit is an audit is an audit." Any "bad" audit has impli
cations for quality control. Should not, then, every audit in litigation
be given sufficient attention to discover whether it reveals a weakness
in quality control so that any weakness, if one exists, can be eliminated?
From our vantage point, looking back on an extended period o f
close association with the activities o f the Special Investigations
Committee, the progress which it has m ade is closely tied to the in
terplay o f these forces. Recognizing and following these threads will
help us to understand the difficulty and the nature o f that progress.

Chapter 2
THE NEED AND THE SOLUTION
The Dem and for Regulation
In the latter part o f the 1970s, the accounting profession came
under Congressional scrutiny and criticism. With the advantage o f
hindsight, one could readily conclude that this should have been ex
pected sooner or later. An advanced econom ic society is heavily de
pendent on free financial markets and the easy flow o f credit for the
allocation o f its scarce resources. This requires som e mechanism for
evaluating the reliability o f the claims o f past and future success by
those seeking to obtain additional resources. Audited financial state
ments provided a widely accepted basis for such evaluations. The
profession o f public accounting perform ed the audits largely free o f
any significant governm ent supervision. Sooner or later, however,
major cases in which accountants were alleged to be at fault, and the
public had suffered financial losses, were bound to attract Congres
sional attention.
When Congressional investigators "discovered" independent au
diting, found it wanting, and proposed regulation to correct alleged
deficiencies, the profession was taken by surprise, nevertheless, the
profession's leadership proved equal to the "em ergency." In effect,
the profession negotiated a suitable response working closely with
the Securities and Exchange Commission which in turn had to satisfy
the profession's Congressional critics. From the profession's point o f
view, a self-regulatory program was clearly preferable to governm ent
regulation. The story o f that negotiation is undoubtedly a fascinating
one, and one yet to be fully told. But that is not our purpose here.
Suffice it to note that governm ent regulation was forestalled; the
profession's self-regulatory proposal was given a trial period to dem
onstrate its worth under the scrutiny o f the SEC. If self-regulation served
the public interest in adequate fashion, it would be accepted. If not,
Congress would supplement the program as necessary.
The profession's proposal included (1) expansion o f the AICPA to
include a Division for CPA Firms with two Sections, (2) membership
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rules in each section that held the m em ber firms to rigorous require
ments including triennial peer reviews o f each firm's quality control
system and its audit performance in compliance with that system,
and (3), for the SEC Practice Section, an independent Public Oversight
Board to assure that the public interest in independent auditing re
ceived appropriate consideration at all times.

Self-R egulation Through Peer Review
The heart o f this system was to be a triennial peer review. The
emphasis in peer review was on the specific firm's system o f quality
control and the firm's compliance with it. There was explicit recogni
tion that personnel failure was always a possibility. Compliance with
a satisfactory system o f quality control m ade audit failure by a con
scientious and adequately trained auditor unlikely. Yet, no system
could, at acceptable cost, completely eliminate the potential for human
error or assure that a wayward partner or staff m em ber might not fail
to perform in accordance with the requirements o f the quality control
system.
To assure that the system was effective, a peer review was to
include examination not only o f the system itself— that is the em 
ployment practices, guidance manuals, other instructions, checklists,
training programs, reference facilities, and other components o f the
system— but was also to include review o f the application o f that system
as documented in the workpapers o f recently com pleted audit en
gagements. Discussion with the responsible auditors was a regular
feature o f this review o f workpapers.
At the conclusion o f a peer review, the review team 's findings
were discussed with the reviewed firm's representatives in an exit
conference. Thereafter, an opinion was to be issued by the peer review
team, accompanied by a letter o f comment if necessary. The reviewed
firm was expected to respond to the letter o f com m ent in writing. A
copy o f the opinion, letter o f comment, and the firm's letter o f response
were included in a public file at the AICPA open for inspection by
anyone interested.

The N eed and the Solution
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Traumatic as the idea o f peer review may have been, the profes
sion went forward with the program. Early on, the Securities and Ex
change Commission was assigned the responsibility to report annually
to Congress on its evaluation o f the functioning o f the self-regulatory
program o f the accounting profession. The SEC was provided "access"
to the functioning o f the peer review program, including review o f
selected peer review and POB workpapers masked as to the identity
o f the specific audit engagements for which audit workpapers were
reviewed. The SEC s ta ffs review has resulted in acceptance o f the
quality o f the peer review process and strong endorsement o f the
peer review program by the SEC in its report to Congress each year.

Litigation — The Fatal Flaw
Shortly after the self-regulatory program was instituted, Congres
sional critics perceived what they considered a "fatal flaw" in the pro
cess. Although peer review might be a satisfactory way o f evaluating a
firm's system for conducting its accounting and auditing practice, it
did not deal with specific alleged audit failures. Peer review standards
perm itted the exclusion o f engagem ents in litigation so that the
reviewer's findings could not becom e a matter for discovery by the
plaintiff. Yet allegations o f audit failure in litigation at least implied
that the quality control system had not succeeded in its purpose. Unless
something was done immediately, it might fail again. This was the
asserted "fatal flaw" in the system as it stood then.
The critics reasoned, what good is a peer review program if audit
failures continue? What good is a self-regulatory program if those guilty
o f substandard work are not punished? "One CPA in jail is worth m ore
than all the peer reviews ever m ade" was one critic's comment.

The SIC A s a Solution
This led the Public Oversight Board, very early in its existence, to
urge that a com m ittee b e appointed to investigate the quality control
implications o f such litigation. As Vice-Chairman Garrett had analo
gized: "Was the crash the result o f 'pilot error' or 'equipment failure'?"
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The question was not * Who was at fault?" so much as " What must be
done to assure the public that similar errors (if any had occurred)
would not be repeated in the future?" The Board reasoned that litiga
tion filed against a m em ber firm suggested the possibility that either
the firm had a quality control weakness o f som e kind that peer review
had not discovered, or that the profession's guidance was inadequate
in som e respect. And the public interest required that the profession
take prompt steps to determine if either o f these possibilities was
true.
O f course, there were other possibilities. The auditors could have
been misled by collusive action on the part o f the auditee's staff or
management, action that would have required investigatory work well
beyond that included in a normal financial audit. Or there might have
been an audit deficiency that resulted from a personnel failure that
had nothing to do with the firm's system o f quality control. Yet, because
the possibility o f system weakness or inadequate guidance could not
be denied, something m ore in the way o f investigation was required.
From the point o f view o f the Public Oversight Board, the public interest
required the profession to provide for such investigations as part o f
its self-regulatory program.
To its credit, the Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section
responded affirmatively. The Special Investigations Com m ittee was
created and appointed, but not without serious misgivings on the part
o f som e accountants at the highest levels in the SEC Practice Section.

The Special Investigations Com m ittee and Litigation
Risk
The fears o f those m embers o f the Executive Committee o f the
SEC Practice Section who opposed formation o f the Special Investiga
tions Committee were genuine. Litigation against firms had becom e a
substantial and increasing burden. The potential loss in class action
suits was staggering. Many accountants believed that the legal system
was biased in favor o f plaintiffs, and that damages assessed against
accounting firms bore little or no relation to their responsibilities for

The n e e d and the Solution
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investors' losses. The cost o f litigation in tim e, undesirable publicity,
and uncertainty was painful to all concerned. With the balance already
weighted in favor o f the plaintiff, why should a defendant firm be put
further at a disadvantage by investigation o f its quality controls and
audit practice by the Special Investigations Com m ittee? And who knew
how far the com m ittee m ight go and whether its work m ight be used
by plaintiff's bar?

Traditional AICPA Policy Re C ases in Litigation
It may be w ell to point out here that the AICPA had a w ell estab
lished policy o f not investigating cases in litigation. Ethics charges
against a m em ber might be m ade in connection with the suit, but the
Ethics Com m ittee would wait until any litigation had been settled and
then proceed as seem ed appropriate in the circumstances. The reasons
fo r this policy w ere tw ofold. First, the system o f ju stice in this country
provides litigants with rights and rules o f procedure designed to fa
cilitate full and fair investigation and settlem ent o f issues and disputes.
A professional body like the AICPA has few o f the powers o f our judicial
system to proceed effectively in obtaining all the relevant inform ation
available without infringing on the rights o f those involved. Second,
any action against a person by his professional peers, regardless o f
the ultimate outcom e o f that action, conceivably could be used by
plaintiff's attorneys to a defendant's detriment in either civil or criminal
proceedings. Thus the establishm ent o f the Special Investigations
Com m ittee included at least the suggestion that the AICPA m ight be
m odifying its traditional policy, a policy m ost m em bers thought was
essential to their welfare.

Chapter 3
IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION
The Special Investigations Com m ittee's Organizational
Docum ent
A careful reading o f the Organizational Document will reveal:
1.

Considerable care to assure that m em ber firms would not be
sanctioned without due process and ample opportunity for de
fense.

2.

Strong emphasis on the importance o f confidentiality for all Spe
cial Investigations Committee activity. Concern was expressed
that the work o f the committee might b ecom e known to plaintiff
bar and be used against m em ber firms engaged in litigation.

3.

A need to balance the public interest with the prejudice to a firm,
or individuals within the firm, that could occur if the SIC w ere to
com m ence and continue an investigation while the firm or indi
viduals in it were involved in litigation.

The Organizational Document provided for a nine-member com 
mittee o f experienced auditors, each eligible for two staggered threeyear terms. The purpose o f the com m ittee was threefold, to:
1.

Identify corrective measures, if any, that should be taken by a
m em ber firm involved in a specific alleged audit failure.

2.

Determine whether facts related to specific alleged audit failures
indicated that changes in generally accepted auditing standards
or qualify control standards needed to be considered.3

3.

Recommend to the Executive Committee, when deem ed neces
sary, appropriate sanctions with respect to m em ber firms.

Member firms were required to report to the committee, within
30 days o f service on them o f first pleading, any litigation against
them or their personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly
announced by a regulatory agency, com m enced on or after Novem ber
1, 1979, if that litigation alleges deficiencies in the conduct o f an
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audit or reporting thereon in connection with any required filing un
der the Federal securities laws. The initial notification was to be ac
companied by a copy o f the complaint or indictment or other charges
filed.

Instructions to the Special Investigations Com m ittee
On receipt o f such information, the com m ittee was obliged to
"screen," that is review, the information and to determine what the
com m ittee's further procedures would be. These procedures were
identified in the Organizational Document as "(1) to 'monitor' devel
opments in the case without investigation o f the firm or the case,
pending the conclusion o f litigation or other proceeding or investiga
tion; (2) to 'investigate the firm' without investigating the case; (3) to
recom m end 'investigation o f the case' to the Executive Committee;
and/or (4) to close its files on the case."
Monitoring was a holding action in anticipation o f developm ents
or disclosures that would provide the com m ittee with additional infor
mation that would help it choose among its other options. Investiga
tion o f a firm was to b e initiated if the complaint or other information
implied strongly that the public interest required;
1.

A review o f certain o f the firm's quality control policies and pro
cedures, and/or a review o f compliance with those policies and
procedures by certain offices or individuals.

2.

A review o f other engagements perform ed by the firm's office(s)
or personnel involved in the case or o f other engagements in the
sam e industry.3

3.

Interviews o f the firm's personnel with functional responsibility
for a specialized industry if the case involved such an industry.

Obviously, investigation o f a firm was not something desired by
any m em ber firm. The implications o f such an investigation were that
either the firm or som e o f its personnel may have fallen short o f pro
fessional standards. No m em ber o f the Section looked forward to the
possibility o f being the first firm so investigated.

Implementing the Solution

15

The Ultim ate Action — Investigation o f a Case
Investigation o f a case was the most severe treatment that a firm
could receive, short o f a sanction. The clear implication o f such an
investigation was that a serious failure in complying with quality con
trol standards was suspected, that som eone was at fault, and that
despite the AICPA's traditional policy regarding litigation, immediate
action was necessary for the protection o f the public and the good o f
the profession. The decision for so extreme an action was not to be
trusted to the Special Investigations Committee by itself. If the com 
mittee thought that a case should be investigated, it would recom 
mend such action to the Executive Committee, and could do nothing
m ore without express authorization from the Executive Committee.
And before making such a recommendation to the Executive
Committee, the SIC "shall advise the firm o f its intention to make
such a recommendation and shall give the firm (through counsel or
otherwise) an opportunity to present its views in writing as to whether
such recommendation is appropriate in the circumstances. If the rec
ommendation is m ade to the Executive Committee, the firm shall be
given an opportunity to express its views in writing to the Executive
Committee."
Precisely what would be included in an investigation o f a case
was never specified. The general belief seem ed to b e that the com 
mittee would set out to find what went wrong and who was responsible.
The fact that such an investigation would be undertaken only "in the
most egregious cases," implied rather strongly that the firm or indi
viduals responsible would have a difficult tim e in establishing their
innocence or the propriety o f their actions.
To say that som e m embers o f the SEC Practice Section thought
the Section had gone too far in giving such powers to its new Special
Investigations Committee is an understatement. Considerable concern
was soon expressed that the com m ittee had far too much authority
and might well increase the already substantial risks o f litigation in
ways detrimental to the entire profession.
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Efforts to Provide Additional Guidance to the SIC
An early response to the fears expressed by som e m embers o f
the Section was an attempt to devise and establish operational pro
cedures to specify more clearly than did the Organizational Document
the process to be follow ed by the new Special Investigations Com 
mittee. In attempting to work out a set o f operational guides for the
Special Investigations Committee, the AICPA staff found the leadership
o f the SEC Practice Section so opposed to any procedure that might
increase litigation risk as to make the task a m ost difficult one. How
ever, hours and days o f thoughtful work in drafting proposed rules
and negotiating term inology differences ultimately resulted in the
"Decision Tree and Criteria for Acting on Reported Cases," which was
adopted by the Special Investigations Committee in March 1981. From
the outset, the approach called for in these guidelines provoked pro
found concerns among Executive Committee m embers who feared
that the SIC might implement them in ways that would unwittingly
escalate the litigation risk to m em ber firms.
Criteria like "significant reasonable public demand for prompt
discipline o f the firm for alleged gross violation o f generally accepted
auditing standards" calling for investigation o f a case, and "high public
interest or reasonable possibility o f future audit failures" as justifica
tion for investigation o f a firm posed risks they considered too great
to be accepted.
Looking back on that crucial period in SIC history, one can have
som e sympathy for the fears expressed by the mem bers o f that Ex
ecutive Committee. The "decision tree" was intended to be a working
tool to be applied with judgm ent by SIC members. But the mem bers
o f the Executive Committee— which included several o f the firms
serving the predominant majority o f public companies and therefore
having much o f the litigation the SIC would have to consider—had
had no experience dealing with these SIC m embers who were about
to apply the procedures o f the decision tree to their cases. Rigid ap
plication could be disastrous, consequently, a join t task force o f Ex
ecutive Committee and SIC members set out to prune the "decision
tree."
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That effort led to the scrapping o f the "decision tree" in favor o f a
document developed by the join t task force which was titled "Guide
lines and Considerations Relevant to Actions on Reported Litigation."
The guidelines in this document were intended to be less rigid. How
ever, certain Executive Committee mem bers still found aspects o f
the guidelines objectionable. They were adopted by default by the
SIC in February 1983, because the SIC had to get on with its business.
In any event, a blue ribbon committee had only recently been form ed
to study the objectives and activities o f the Section, including the
SIC.
According to the guidelines, SIC members carefully had to weigh
the public interest in a case and the possible prejudice that SIC activity
concerning a case could cause to a m em ber firm's defense in litigation.
SIC mem bers were provided with a list o f factors relevant to their
assessment o f public interest. In addition, the guidelines provided for
possible inquiries o f m em ber firms. Except for inquiries specifically
related to the alleged audit failure, firms were expected to provide
information in response. The guidelines included the caveat that a
decision to investigate a firm could result in significant prejudice to
pending litigation or other proceedings o f a firm. Accordingly, a feature
was added to the process to protect the interest o f firms, namely—
before the SIC would vote on whether an investigation o f a firm should
be ordered, henceforth, a m em ber firm would be given the opportu
nity to appear before the com m ittee to hear the reasons for such a
motion and to present its views.

Early Difficulties Facing the Com m ittee
Establishing the Special Investigations Committee and appointing
its first mem bers did not assure its success. Few committees in the
history o f the AICPA faced as much opposition or carried such heavy
burdens.
The requirement o f absolute confidentiality, intended to protect
m embers o f the profession in litigation, stood like a wall between the
committee members and their professional colleagues. Very few people

18

Evolution o f the Quality Control Inquiry Committee

in the profession had any idea what the com m ittee did, how it oper
ated, or what influenced its decisions. Although the com m ittee was
com posed o f reasonable men who went about their difficult task
sensibly and responsibly, the com m ittee was forbidden to make this
information known. Only committee members, the POB, and a few
AICPA staff m em bers knew that the "decision tree," and later "the
guidelines," existed. Almost unavoidably, therefore, the knowledge
that such a com m ittee had been appointed but operated in secret
resulted in greater concern about its activities than was justified.
The strong feeling that the committee should not investigate spe
cific cases except in the most unusual circumstances and then only
with permission o f the Executive Committee o f the Section, together
with the concern that the committee would exceed its authority, meant
that any questions by committee m embers during screening or moni
toring that were related in any way to a reported case were m et with a
cold rebuff: "Mow you are investigating the case."
At the sam e time, critics o f the profession and its self-regulatory
apparatus were eager to have a case investigated. In effect, they chal
lenged the profession to prove that it would identify and fix responsi
bility for audit deficiencies. To many o f them, regulation meant finding
and punishing the guilty. Until the SIC did exactly that, its credibility
would not be established. Indeed, the entire self-regulatory program
remained under a cloud.
Even som e friends o f the profession had doubts that it would
ever go so far as to permit investigation o f a case. Som e o f them
asserted that including the possibility o f investigation o f a case in the
Organizational Document was a mistake. They firmly believed that
the established policy o f the AICPA would withstand modification, and
that the kind o f investigation necessary to establish responsibility in
specific sets o f circumstances should be left to the judicial system.
Thus, including provision for investigation o f a case was unrealistic
and would lead to expectations that could never b e fulfilled.

Implementing the Solution

19

Early W ork by the Special Investigations Com m ittee
Y e t even during this period o f unsuccessful negotiation, concern,
and seem ing frustration, progress in establishing the SIC as an impor
tant factor in the self-regulatory program was made. The m em bers o f
the com m ittee were in place, litigation was reported, task forces were
appointed and assigned to instances o f litigation reported to the Sec
tion. The com m ittee members read the allegations, discussed them
with other mem bers o f the committee, inquired o f the firms involved,
closed som e cases, monitored others, and gradually developed working
procedures.
When one line o f questioning failed, another was tried. Som e
firm representatives were much more forthcoming than others; som e
com m ittee m embers were more skilled and m ore persistent in their
pursuit o f information than others. Strengthening one another in their
com m ittee meetings through reports o f inquiries during the screen
ing process; refusing to close cases when responses to inquiries were
unsatisfactory; the first members o f the committee deserve great credit
for developing procedures and standards, however informal, that have
served the com m ittee and the profession well. By going about their
work with diligence and persistence, yet with an awareness o f the
sensitivity o f the matters they dealt with, the early mem bers o f the
com m ittee slowly began to overcom e som e o f the fears o f those in
volved in the cases reported to the committee.

Chapter 4
TESTING THE SOLUTION
The Credibility Issue
One o f the purposes in establishing the SEC Practice Section was
to convince Congress that governm ental regulation o f public ac
counting was unnecessary, that the profession was both responsive
and responsible, and was better able to police its mem bers' activities
than anyone else. To persuade Congress that such was the case, the
profession needed the support o f the SEC. The SEC staff was able to
satisfy itself through review o f selected peer review workpapers that
the peer review program was working satisfactorily. The confidential
ity requirements im posed upon the SIC made any such arrangement
with respect to SIC activities much m ore difficult to establish. Liaison
efforts between the SEC staff and POB representatives continued for
som e tim e in the hope that som e form o f "access" to SIC activities
could b e w orked out. The con fiden tiality requ irem en t fo r the
com m ittee's activities frustrated every effort.
SEC staff members took the position that they could not "approve"
the work o f the SIC unless they knew what that work consisted of.
Could the SEC staff send a representative to SIC meetings as an ob
server? The answer had to be negative. Would the SEC staff be willing
to rely on oral or written assurances from m embers o f the POB that
the SIC was perform ing its task satisfactorily? Again, the answer had
to be negative. The SEC staff could not approve the perform ance o f
the Special Investigations Committee without direct information as to
the nature o f the allegations against a firm and how the com m ittee
satisfied itself that anything about those allegations having any rel
evance to the reliance the public placed on audited financial state
ments had been dealt with satisfactorily.
The litigation-related fears o f the m em ber firms that led directly
to strict confidentiality, and the need o f the SEC staff for "access"
sufficient to provide direct information, resulted in an impasse. Con
siderable time was to be spent in exploring such possibilities as oral
briefings by POB mem bers and staff to SEC staff members, review o f
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POB workpapers, and the developm ent o f closed case summaries.
The difficulties each party to the difference has had in conceding
enough to satisfy the other have seem ed insurmountable. However,
as o f the date o f this writing, while the SEC has yet formally to ex
press satisfaction with the work o f the SIC, there is reason to be op
timistic that the Commission will soon recognize the role o f the SIC in
the self-regulatory program.

The First "Investigation o f a Firm" — Three o f Them!
But the ultimate question remained: What will happen if and when
the com m ittee finds an investigation beyond screening and monitor
ing necessary? Unavoidably, that question was finally faced, and the
circumstances could hardly have been m ore difficult for the commit
tee.
A single auditee had been the client o f three major firms in suc
cession. The client failed. A regulatory agency in the client's industry
had made information available while the SIC had the case "in moni
toring" that convinced the committee investigations o f the firms were
required. Thus the com m ittee had not on e but three investigations in
mind. But there was a catch, one o f the firms contended that litigation
involving it had been com m enced before the Novem ber 1, 1979 cut
o ff date. Hence, on technical grounds, that firm raised an objection
to being investigated. It contended that the Special Investigations
Committee lacked jurisdiction because the date o f the first litigation
in the case preceded the Novem ber 1, 1979 date on which the SIC's
authority com m enced. The technical questions o f whether the other
firms could then claim the same exemption and whether the first firm's
claim was valid had never been faced before.
The Special Investigations Committee reconsidered its reasons
for recommending the investigations and decided to proceed. Legal
representatives o f the AICPA and the three firms involved m et to dis
cuss the legalities at issue. No resolution o f the disagreement emerged.
The com m ittee decided to take its case to the Executive Committee
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and requested permission to investigate the firm that claimed juris
dictional protection at the same time it investigated the other two
firms.
Under the terms o f the Organizational D ocum ent the Special In
vestigations Committee had the right to initiate an investigation o f a
firm on its own authority. But to get the Novem ber 1, 1979 cutoff
date waived so it could treat the three firms alike, the com m ittee had
to com e to the Executive Committee for its permission
The session with the Executive Committee was not a pleasant
one for the representatives o f the Special Investigations Committee.
Restricted by the requirement o f confidentiality for the com m ittee's
work, they were unable to present a com plete explanation. Unavoid
ably, the fact that the com m ittee proposed to investigate three firms,
each a national firm, surfaced during this discussion. Som e members
o f the Executive Committee seized upon this as evidence that the
committee, in its zeal, had gone much too far and now constituted a
threat to the profession. The Executive Committee decided to wait
until its next m eeting to resolve the issue, thereby giving all involved
time to cool down and think the problem through.

POB Support and Professional Criticism
During this waiting period, the chairman and other mem bers o f
the Special Investigations Committee m et with the POB to present
their case. The POB also m et with the Planning Committee o f the Ex
ecutive Committee and stated its support for the Special Investiga
tions Committee. The Planning Committee o f the Executive Commit
tee at this point was persuaded to approve the SIC's request. The
firm that relied on the cutoff date for its defense then agreed to waive
that defense and to accept an investigation o f the firm along with the
other two firms.
The investigations then went forward. They served the purposes
o f the committee, but left som e Executive Committee members much
disturbed. Som e time later, one o f them wrote a widely circulated
seven-page letter to an AICPA staff m em ber denouncing the establish
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ment o f the Special Investigations Committee. Am ong his comments
were the following:
From having participated in most of the meetings that led up to
the formation o f the SIC, I know that the drafters would have pre
ferred not to provide for investigations of a case, or even o f a
firm, while litigation is in process. They yielded on this point be
cause o f pressure from the Public Oversight Board and the SEC,
but I know that they did not expect many investigations under
those circumstances. This expectation is proving to be completely
unrealistic... Specifically, it sounds as if the investigation of the
firm is far enough removed from the specifics of a particular case
to make it substantially less risky. As a practical matter, however,
the fact that the investigation has been initiated as a result of a
case is in itself prejudicial.

The concern about the undesirable effect that an "investigation o f a
firm" might have on the ultimate outcom e o f litigation expressed in
the letter was shared by many others in the profession and consti
tuted the environment in which the first investigations were conducted.

Nature o f the First Investigations
The investigations included reviews o f the manuals, checklists,
and other practice aids the firms used in the conduct o f audits in the
industry o f the alleged audit failure. In addition, the workpapers for a
sample o f engagements in that industry were reviewed in various
practice offices including work perform ed by the office and the en
gagement team responsible for the alleged audit failure for each firm.
The firms that had perform ed the previous peer review o f each
firm under investigation were requested by the SIC to conduct the
investigations under supervision by SIC representatives. Those mak
ing the investigations were careful to avoid any action that might be
construed as investigation o f or inquiry into the specific case in liti
gation.
Through these investigations, the Special Investigations Commit
tee satisfied itself that the three firms had fundamentally sound ap
proaches to conducting audits in the industry in question, and were
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applying those approaches in an appropriate manner. One o f the firms
was found to have inadequate documentation in its workpapers o f
important audit conclusions on one client. Nevertheless, the investi
gators were satisfied with that firm's conclusions and the bases on
which they were founded.

Lessons Learned from These Investigations
If w e try to summarize the lessons learned through these first
three investigations o f firms, we might make statements like the fol
lowing:
1.

Performance o f the review did not subject the firms to any ob
servable litigation risk not already present.

2.

Investigations perform ed by the firms' peer reviewers under the
supervision o f representatives o f the SIC were com pletely satis
factory to the SIC representatives in charge o f the investigations.

3.

Useful investigations could be perform ed without intrusion into
the case in litigation that caused the investigation. Yet information
about the case in litigation, obtained from whatever source, could
be crucial in determ ining whether additional investigation is
needed.

4.

A special investigation could uncover matters o f sufficient impor
tance to require the firm in question to take remedial action.
A n oth er lesson o f quite a d ifferen t kind cam e out o f the

committee's experience with these first investigations. The committee
had been following the three reported cases since February 1980 and
had discussed issues related to them with the reporting firms. However,
it was not until Novem ber 1981, when the SIC obtained a copy o f a
report prepared by a Special Examiner appointed by the U.S. Bank
ruptcy Court, that the SIC finally obtained information sufficient to
identify the relevant quality control issues involved and to determine
that investigations o f the firms were called for. One wonders if these
investigations would have occurred if there had not been an examiner's
report available to the SIC.
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These three cases raised anew the question o f whether the SIC
could properly perform its function without som e discussion with firms
reporting cases. These investigations were launched long after the
litigation had been reported, and only after details o f what might have
gone wrong were made public as a result o f investigations perform ed
for a trustee in bankruptcy. If any o f the three firms had had serious
quality control deficiencies related to its work in the relevant indus
try, a considerable period o f time would have elapsed before any
action resulted from the SIC's involvement.
The SIC could not always count on other interested bodies to
provide key information. Neither could it wait until such information
becam e publicly available. As a minimum, the SIC representatives
needed to discuss the allegations in reported cases with firm repre
sentatives to be in a position to determine whether significant quality
control issues were present. Following the com pletion o f these in
vestigations, m embers o f the SIC task forces were much less reluctant
to direct questions to firm representatives about the specific allega
tions in reported cases.
Equally important, as time passed, firm representatives becam e
perceptibly less defensive in their responses to such questions. By
June 30, 1984, m em ber firms had reported almost 100 cases to the
SIC. Firms were gradually losing their fear o f this new com m ittee that
could intrude on what had heretofore been the firm's m ost private
business. Also, the conduct o f the SIC representatives had been found
not to add significantly to any firm's litigation risk. We have yet to
learn o f any instance in which conduct o f an investigation by the Special
Investigations Committee has had any direct or indirect bearing on
the outcom e o f litigation against a firm or individuals.

Chapter 5
STRENGTHENING THE SOLUTION
The Chetkovich Com m ittee
At about this time, the Special Investigations Committee received
crucial support from a Special Review Com m ittee form ed by the
AICPA's Board o f Directors in 1983 to study the structure, operation,
and effectiveness o f the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory program.
After a thorough study o f the work o f the Section's committees, the
Special Review Committee, informally referred to by the name o f its
chairman, Michael N. Chetkovich, made the following recommenda
tions, among others:
1.

That the Special Investigations Com m ittee b e continued with
much the sam e responsibilities.

2.

That the possibility o f an investigation o f a case be struck from
the SIC Organizational Document.3

3.

That the SIC be enabled to obtain information directly from re
porting firms in order to discharge its responsibilities promptly.
In effect, each o f these recommendations recognized what already

existed in fact. The Special Investigations Committee had proved its
worth, and although the Securities and Exchange Commission had
not yet given the com m ittee any formal approval, any attempt to dis
continue the SIC and its work would have m et with great resistance.
Also, the nature o f the Special Investigations Com m ittee's work, al
ways directed toward remedial measures leaving punishment to the
courts, meant that an investigation o f a case was very unlikely ever to
take place.
Finally, som e o f the m ore aggressive members o f the SIC had
already begun to direct questions to m em ber firms about specific
cases in litigation. Such questions were not an attempt to find fault or
to fix blame; they were a relatively econom ical way to get at possible
quality control weaknesses. "How did the firm respond to the allega
tions? Was the office involved included in the last peer review? What
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were the findings? Were the mem bers o f the audit team covered in
the last inspection program? How did they com e out in the evalua
tions? How had the firm evaluated the client as an audit risk? Were
any special steps taken in selection o f the audit team? Did the client's
industry present any special problems? What measures were taken to
assure that the audit team received any special help needed to deal
with industry problems?"
Almost unavoidably, these kinds o f questions were finding their
way into the operating procedures o f the committee. And as firm rep
resentatives becam e persuaded that com m ittee m embers were not
interested in judging the adequacy o f the audit through the informa
tion received in such exchanges, they becam e less concerned about
the possibility that the committee was obtaining information that might
ultimately be used against the firm in litigation. Indeed, the coopera
tion o f som e firms in the work o f the com m ittee clearly indicated that
those firms were as anxious to discover and correct any weaknesses
in their quality control systems as was the committee.
So the recommendations o f the Chetkovich Committee were far
from revolutionary. Nonetheless, they were extremely important. An
objective review o f the activities o f the Section by an independent
and high quality com m ittee did much to strengthen the acceptance
and position o f the Special Investigations Committee. Criticisms by
representatives o f m em ber firms now had to be supported by som e
thing m ore than vague assertions that the com m ittee was a threat
and a menace.

The "Second Round" o f Investigations
Just about the tim e the com m ittee was launching its first round
o f investigations, and doing so in the face o f considerable criticism,
two additional cases were reported that were unrelated except that
both involved the same m em ber firm. In both cases, the client com 
panies and their m anagem ents would be severely censured for
"cooking the b o o k s' to mask financial difficulties. These cases raised
the question: Where were the auditors? Less than two months from
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the date o f the regulatory complaint against the company and its
management in the first o f these two cases, the Special Investigations
Committee decided that the public interest required an investigation
o f the firm. It did so even though the CFA firm was not named in the
complaint.
Having fought its way through the opposition to its first investiga
tions, the com m ittee was prepared for whatever might be necessary
to investigate the firm in question in the current cases. But the situation
turned out to be substantially different. The firm representative was
very open and forthcoming. The cases received heavy media attention.
The com m ittee would likely have been criticized both within and
without the profession if it had not m oved quickly to com m ence ap
propriate investigations.
The first three investigations were conducted by m em ber firms,
in each case the firm responsible for the last peer review o f the firm
under investigation. For the next investigation, the SIC selected a team
o f reviewers under the direct supervision o f a practitioner whose
reputation for personal integrity and whose other professional cre
dentials were well known. The com m ittee maintained overall supervi
sion and review responsibility through two o f its members. The team
selected and reviewed 13 audit engagements o f publicly-held clients
in the four offices that participated in the two allegedly substandard
audits, including work supervised by the partners and managers re
sponsible for the audits under question.
The review uncovered serious quality control deficiencies in one
o f the four offices and the need for extensive corrective action. This
included but was not limited to (a) appointing a new partner in charge
o f one office, (b) requiring in-depth concurring partner review on future
engagements by qualified partners from outside the office, and (c)
both reassigning and terminating audit personnel, including partners.
The SIC required the firm to develop a comprehensive remedial ac
tion plan, evaluated its comprehensiveness and adequacy and, finally,
monitored its implementation.
The m em ber firm in question was ultimately named in a regulatory
action, which required the firm to undergo another review o f its audit
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practice. This did not occur until after the SIC had conducted the
extensive investigation.
Strict confidentiality was maintained by the com m ittee over the
conduct and results o f the investigations o f the four offices. Neither
the public nor the SEC staff was aware o f them. The fact that the
investigations had resulted in prompt correction o f quality control de
ficiencies was clearly in the public interest. These investigations were
undertaken and com pleted while litigation was in progress and with
out any apparent harm to the firm's litigation status. This action showed
responsiveness to Congressional criticism, namely, that the self-regu
latory program should not wait until litigation was settled before deal
ing with alleged audit failures. Additionally, it demonstrated that liti
gation damage did not necessarily result from doing so.
The Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section could have
authorized public disclosure o f information concerning the investiga
tion o f the firm for those two cases but decided against it. Consider
able sentiment to the contrary existed at the time because o f the
public criticism o f the profession that the two cases had attracted.
The Executive Committee was still sensitive to fears about damage to
a firm 's defenses in litigation. It argued further that other firms faced
with a similar set o f circumstances might be less cooperative in
agreeing to corrective action if they felt such actions would be made
public.
The POB's 1982-83 annual report was factual and brief on these
matters:
To date, the committee (Special Investigations) has conducted in
vestigations of select aspects o f the quality control systems of
four member firms...These investigative teams generally exam
ined other engagements supervised by personnel involved in the
alleged failure and engagements in similar industries and with
similar accounting and auditing issues to those involved in the
reported litigation...Three o f the four investigations resulted in
recommendations for improvement in the firm's quality control
system or compliance therewith, all o f which were voluntarily
implemented by each of the firms...the committee is keeping its
file open on the fourth investigation pending the receipt o f the
findings o f an ongoing review to determine whether the suggested
improvements have in fact been implemented.
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Other P ro gress by the Quality Control Inquiry Com m ittee
Much o f the committee's accomplishments through June 3 0 , 1984
was related to the four investigations described, yet the com m ittee
grew in stature and effectiveness for several other reasons. Its accu
mulating record o f dealing with each reported case in a professional
manner, not hesitating to close cases when it found no public interest
aspects to be pursued, helped m em ber firms to develop confidence
in its objectivity. Without any significant jurisdictional conflict, the
committee added three important cases to its agenda, notwithstand
ing the fact that not one o f the three was required to be reported
under the SEC Practice Section requirements.
Each o f the cases involved an alleged failure in the audit o f a
financial institution. The evident importance o f such cases to the
profession's reputation and the public's interest in them convinced
the com m ittee m em bers that they required attention. These cases
established a precedent for including similar cases in the future.

D ialogue with the Auditing Standards Board
In combination with other cases o f alleged failure to properly
audit the financial statements o f banks, two o f the cases caused the
committee to question the adequacy o f available professional guidance
for the conduct o f such audits. As a result, the Public Oversight Board
on Septem ber 2, 1983 wrote the com m ittee expressing its support
for a reconsideration o f the adequacy o f current professional guidance.
The letter noted the recent spate o f bank failures and suggested that
these w ere likely to underm ine the p u blic's con fid en ce in the
profession's ability to audit banks satisfactorily. It encouraged the
committee to open a dialogue with the AICPA's Auditing Standards
Board.
As a consequence, the committee initiated such a dialogue with
the Auditing Standards Board and with the Institute's Banking Com
mittee. This proved to be the first o f a series o f dialogues with the
Auditing Standards Board; these now occur as necessary but no less
frequently than annually.
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The exchange with the Banking Committee resulted in valuable
additional guidance to auditors o f banks. Published in The CPA Let

ter, this guidance alerted practitioners to som e important aspects o f
bank auditing. For example, practitioners were urged to consider
carefully the possible implications o f insider loans, loan participations
purchased and sold, and undue loan concentrations in evaluating the
adequacy o f the allowance for loan losses.

Other Results o f the Financial Institutions' Audit C ases
In addition to recommending attention to guidance for bank au
diting, the com m ittee's work with the three cases focused attention
on questions about the effectiveness o f quality controls and compli
ance therewith in the three firms that audited the financial institutions.
Each firm gave its total cooperation.
One o f the cases clearly exem plified the mutuality o f interest
between private regulation (actions taken within firms) and the selfregulatory program (peer review and the special investigations pro
cess). While the Special Investigations Com m ittee had previously
caught glimpses o f the actions taken by firms to study and strengthen
quality controls when litigation raised a question about them, this
case provided dramatic evidence o f such action. The firm literally
investigated itself.
An extensive review o f its banking practice was perform ed in
cluding an evaluation o f controls and a testing o f compliance with
firm policy. Top people from other offices were brought in to provide
an objective and thoroughly professional review. The SIC was made
privy to the nature and scope o f the review while it was in process.
On completion o f the review, the committee was given access to all
the findings, made its own evaluation, and helped to shape the cor
rective action plan implemented by the firm. The experience gained
in this case provided a m odel for QCIC action in a number o f subse
quent high profile cases.
In the second o f the three cases, the committee, in a meeting
with representatives o f the firm and its peer reviewing firm, ascer
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tained that the engagement partner had not recently supervised au
dits. The com m ittee satisfied itself through inquiry concerning the
adequacy o f the firm 's quality controls for audit work similar to the
audit in litigation. The committee insisted that the office responsible
for the alleged audit failure be included in the firm's imminent peer
review, and that the peer review team test relevant quality controls.
The third case had earlier received attention from the com m ittee
including extensive discussion o f the allegations o f fault with repre
sentatives o f the firm and review o f a regulatory report which did not
pinpoint any weakness in the firm's quality controls or its audit ap
proach. The com m ittee had then closed the case.
Prompted by sharper and more specific criticism o f the firm's
audit in a new complaint based on additional investigation by a differ
ent regulator, the case was reopened by the com m ittee fourteen
months later. The com m ittee's work convinced it that an investigation
o f the office responsible for the audit was desirable. The investigation
required by the SIC was perform ed by firm personnel from outside
the office and was subjected to review and testing by the firm's regular
peer reviewing firm and by a two-member task force o f the commit
tee. The office was found to be practicing at an acceptable level o f
quality.
As a result o f its work on this case, the com m ittee asked the
AICPA's Professional Ethics Division to review a specific aspect o f the
profession's independence rules. The Ethics Division review resulted
in the issuance o f a clarifying interpretation.

Confidentiality and SEC "A cceptance" o f the Special
Investigations Process
When the Chetkovich Committee reviewed the special investiga
tions process in 1983, it focused on the fact that the SIC's activities,
on advice o f legal counsel, were to be conducted under the constraint
o f com plete confidentiality. Counsel had urged total confidentiality to
avoid possible prejudice o f the defenses o f m em ber firms in litiga
tion. As noted earlier, m em ber firms were very sensitive to the danger
any breach o f that confidentiality might im pose on them.
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Almost no detail about the activities o f the com m ittee and espe
cially no information about specific cases had ever been released. As
a result regulatory bodies, the Congress, and the public had little
basis for evaluating the effectiveness o f the com m ittee and its activi
ties. The hope o f those establishing the com m ittee in response to the
Public Oversight Board's recommendation was that the stature o f the
Board, which did have unlimited access to SIC activity and said so in
its annual report, would be sufficient to give the SIC necessary cred
ibility. This was not to be. The SEC insisted it could not give its ap
proval to the work o f the Special Investigations Committee based solely
on second-hand information, no matter how reputable those provid
ing it.
SEC Commissioner Barbara S. Thomas was publicly critical o f
the protective confidentially surrounding the SIC. In a January 1 2 , 1983
address before the AICPA's National Conference on Current SEC De
velopments, she chided the SEC Practice Section leadership.
...it is well for the Section not only to take decisive action, but
also to assure the public that it has done so. Actions that are
shrouded in secrecy can only reinforce an attitude that the
profession's own interest is being placed before that o f the pub
lic.

It was now clear that something m ore extensive and timely in the
way o f information about SIC cases than appeared in the annual re
ports o f the POB was necessary if the Special Investigations Commit
tee were to b e perceived as fulfilling its purpose. At the request o f the
SEC Practice Section Executive Committee, one o f the m em bers o f
the POB undertook to work with the Chief Accountant o f the SEC in
an effort to devise a plan that would provide the SEC with the infor
mation it felt necessary for evaluating work o f the Special Investiga
tions Committee without unduly jeopardizing the litigation defenses
o f m em ber firms.
After a number o f proposals failed to gain SEC support, the POB
proposed that its staff would prepare and submit to the SEC a quar
terly statistical report o f SIC activity that would include every case
reported to the SIC from initial reference until the case was closed.
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This report was to be supplemented by two summaries, neither o f
which would identify any case by name:
•

Closed case summary, prepared by the POB, which would anony
mously report the reasons for closing each case

•

Investigations summary, prepared by the SIC, to briefly and
anonymously describe the focus and scope o f the investigation,
the composition o f the investigating team, and the com m ittee's
conclusions.

In addition, the POB undertook to report any differences o f judg
ment that might eventuate between its staff mem bers and the SIC.
The reasoning underlying this proposal was that a continuing series
o f reports on SIC activity would persuade the Commission that the
SIC played an important and effective role in the Section's self-regu
latory activities. In April 1983, the Chief Accountant told the POB
representative that the information to be provided under the proposal
was not sufficient to enable the SEC staff to evaluate the effectiveness
o f the SIC. What the SEC staff needed was "access" to SIC activity
similar to its access to peer review workpapers.

Reducing the Confidentiality Requirem ent
Am ong other matters, the Chetkovich Committee addressed the
question o f whether the confidentiality surrounding SIC activities
should be relaxed to provide the SEC staff direct access and to permit
public disclosure o f the remedial and corrective measures resulting
from those activities. In contemplating the answer to this question.
Chairman Chetkovich and his colleagues pondered the significance
o f the following advice from AICPA counsel:
...it would appear highly unlikely that corrective actions under
taken by a member firm on its own initiative, or as a result o f SIC
procedure and recommendations, would be admissible as evi
dence in Federal court litigation to prove negligence or culpability.

Their conclusion was that som e information about the special
investigative process should be m ade public to enhance its credibil
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ity. However, confidentiality should continue with respect to actions
taken on specific cases because o f the "...possibility o f substantial
and often unwarranted prejudice against m em ber firms." Thus the
Chetkovich Committee recom m ended that the Section should:
•

Provide periodic public reports on the SIC's activities that would
include aggregated data and statistics on its cases and informa
tion on remedial and corrective actions taken by m em ber firms
in connection with those cases.

•

Make available in a manner appropriate for educational purposes
information about unusual or recurring problems encountered
in the SIC process.

The Section implemented these recommendations when it pub
licly issued the first report o f the SIC in 1985 covering its activities
from inception through Decem ber 31, 1984.
The com m encem ent o f public reporting on SIC actions and the
results thereof was an important but measured first step to im prove
the SIC's credibility. Such reporting would not be sufficient to gain
SEC endorsement.

Investigations o f Firms as "Special Reviews"
The Chetkovich Committee also made another very significant
suggestion to enhance the credibility o f the SIC. It noted that the
com m ittee's Organizational Document provided for two types o f in
vestigation, the "investigation o f a firm" and the "investigation o f a
case." As explained previously, the Chetkovich Com m ittee had ob
served that the Special Investigations Committee, by natural constraint,
could investigate a firm but not a case. Thus it concluded that provi
sion for investigation o f a case when the SIC would never undertake
to perform one was unrealistic; therefore, the presence o f such a
provision was an impediment to the SIC's credibility.
The term "investigation o f a firm" was replaced by "special review"
without any intent to make the contemplated procedures any less
com prehensive. The revised Organizational Document calls for a
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"special review" whenever the committee reaches one o f the follow
ing conclusions:
•

There is a reasonable likelihood that the firm might need to take
specific corrective actions beyond what the firm may have already
undertaken, and a special review is deem ed necessary to deter
mine the nature and extent o f such actions.

•

There is a reasonable need to obtain timely assurance about
compliance by the firm, or a segment (office or function) thereof,
or by certain o f its personnel, with one or more o f the firm 's
quality control policies and procedures.

Thus, subsequent to Septem ber 1984, an "investigation o f the
firm" becam e a "special review." Whatever the label, the contemplated
procedures were intended to be equally protective o f the public interest
in the reliability and credibility o f audited financial statements. The
term "investigation" was considered to have undesirable implications.
The new designation, "special review," was considered to b e more
descriptive o f the supplementary role the special investigations process
had vis-a-vis the peer review process in the total self-regulatory pro
gram.
As AICPA Vice President Kelley observed in early 1984 in connec
tion with the Chetkovich Committee's work:
It is essential to take reasonable steps to enhance the credibility
o f the SIC because the SIC is essential to the credibility of the
peer review process. Criticism of the peer review process revolves
around the continued existence o f alleged "audit failures" and the
fact that peer review is not specifically designed to deal with the
"people problems" that are likely to be at the root of real audit
failures.

The change from "investigation o f a firm" to "special review" rep
resented a logical evolution at the time it was effected. The deemphasis
o f "investigation" and the use o f "review" related the intended study
to the peer reviews it supplemented. The review was "special" only in
the sense that peer reviews took place on a regular triennial basis,
while "special" reviews differed from peer reviews not in nature or
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substance but in that they occurred on an "as needed" basis and had
a scope solely dictated by the circumstances. To emphasize the dif
ference, the adjective "special" was added.
To som e m em ber firms, that adjective also implies "something
not often done." Thus a special review is unusual and from this idea it
draws attention and concern. Som e m em ber firms believe the new
term also has a negative connotation.

Chapter 6
IMPROVING THE PROCESS
SEC Views on Special Reviews
A consistent criticism voiced by the SEC staff is that the Quality
Control Inquiry Com m ittee should conduct m ore special reviews.
Members o f the SEC staff note that peer review emphasizes the design
o f and compliance with quality control systems, and that if the system
is satisfactory, then failure must be a "people problem ." They argue
that whenever allegations o f failure, if valid, could indicate serious
noncompliance with quality controls, a special review should be con
ducted to assure the public that the problem is not indicative o f a
pattern o f noncompliance or substandard perform ance by engage
ment personnel. If a pattern is found to exist, the solution is to take
remedial steps to assure that the same person or persons will not
make the same or other mistakes in the future.
Thus the SEC staff contends that when the circumstances o f a
reported case suggest that substandard work may have been per
formed, a special review should be directed at other work o f the au
ditors concerned to determine whether they should be permitted to
continue in practice, and, if so, on what terms.

"Internal" Reviews
The discipline inherent in a quality control system should en
courage firms to make their own "people problem " reviews on an
internal basis. They should do so without prodding from the QCIC
whenever they have reason to question the perform ance o f one or
more o f their professionals. Such internal reviews should provide the
most realistic answers to whether the practitioners under scrutiny
should be permitted to continue in practice. After all, no one has
m ore incentive to w eed out incom petent practitioners than their
partners. As w e have already noted in the discussion o f the financial
institutions cases, the SIC during its investigative procedures at times
becom es aware that such an internal review has occurred and is made
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privy to both the findings and the firm's corrective actions. In such
instances, review by the SIC o f the documentation o f the internal
review may obviate the need for a special review or at least enable
the scope o f a special review to be less com prehensive than it other
wise would have been.

Special Reviews — A Considerable Variety
Internal reviews and special reviews have a com m on purpose.
Although few in number and varying in nature, the special reviews
perform ed to date constitute an interesting and unusual part o f the
QCIC's activities. Overall they reflect with considerable accuracy the
evolutionary developm ent o f the com m ittee's policies, practices and
concerns.
Tw elve special reviews have been perform ed to the date o f this
writing; they considered the allegations o f 16 reported cases. In view
o f the number o f firms included in the SEC Practice Section and the
fact that those firms have reported 382 cases from inception o f the
SIC through June 30, 1990, one would have difficulty in arguing that
the com m ittee has ordered special reviews excessively. O f course, it
should be taken into consideration that a number o f special reviews
were obviated because the firms in litigation had conducted "internal
reviews" which, as w e noted earlier, closely approximate the require
ments o f a special review.
The special reviews com pleted to date vary considerably in the
circumstances that caused the reviews to be made, in the methods
followed, in the extent o f QCIC involvement, and in the matters o f
primary interest. No pattern seem s to em erge. Som e reviews were
perform ed by teams o f qualified experts having no previous associa
tion with the reviewed firm, either as investigators or as peer review
ers. Som e were perform ed by m embers o f the QCIC and its staff. In
other cases, the firm 's peer reviewers undertook the special review
reporting their activities to the committee. In every case, the commit
tee both specified the purpose and extent o f the review, and through
its task force, supervised and reviewed the conduct o f review proce
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dures and thus satisfied itself that the objective o f the review had
been attained.
Five o f the twelve reviews have already been discussed; three
focused on quality controls relating to audit practice in a specialized
industry, another focused on the firm's quality controls relating to
com plex public engagements in the four offices which conducted two
engagements in litigation, and the fifth focused on quality controls in
the office that had conducted an engagement that resulted in litiga
tion and included audits perform ed in the sam e industry as that en
gagement, including audits perform ed by the personnel who were
responsible for it.
O f the remaining seven, three were com pleted prior to adoption
by the SIC o f a m ore structured approach as described later in this
paper. One focused on office quality controls and included engage
ments which were conducted by the personnel who supervised the
engagement in litigation and which had characteristics similar to that
engagement; another focused on office-wide quality controls and on
engagements with characteristics similar to and conducted by per
sonnel who perform ed four engagements on which audit failure was
alleged; and the third review involved the evaluation o f quality con
trols over engagements conducted in various offices on which signifi
cant portions o f the audits were perform ed by personnel from other
CPA firms. The first two o f these resulted in changes in office manage
ment, additional education, and expanded engagement review proce
dures. The latter caused the establishment o f additional firm-wide
quality controls and monitoring procedures as well as the performance
o f auditing procedures on certain engagements that were included in
the special review and found to be substandard.
These special reviews were well done and resulted in corrective
actions by the firms that were clearly in the public interest. Even the
SEC so acknowledged, having had access to the results o f the three
reviews just discussed. The concern expressed was why so few spe
cial reviews had been conducted— particularly reviews o f other audit
work perform ed by personnel responsible for conducting an alleg
edly faulty audit. The threshold for requiring a review seem ed to be
too high.
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Since then, four such reviews have been conducted concerning
four cases involving as many firms. Tw o o f these indicated adequate
compliance with quality controls on other engagements; the cases
w ere closed. The third resulted in the finding that on e partner's
workload was too heavy and that additional review procedures should
be em ployed over this partner's work because documentation on his
other audits was deficient in som e important respects. And the fourth
resulted in the finding that the firm's audit guidance relating to the
consideration o f audit risk and materiality was too complex. There
fore, that guidance was revised to avoid the possibility o f misunder
standing by firm personnel.

"P eo p le Problem " Reviews
The variety o f special reviews experienced in the past is unlikely
to continue. Repeated peer reviews tend to strengthen m em ber firms'
systems o f quality control by eliminating deficiencies in these sys
tems. People problems, however, will persist. Hence w e may expect
that special reviews in the future will tend to be o f the people problem
variety.
That focus will m eet the SEC's concern described above. The
QCIC has successfully been experimenting with a form o f special re
view that satisfactorily accomplishes the SEC's objectives and keeps
the costs o f reviews down. Such reviews have been conducted by
com petent firm personnel who were not involved in the alleged fail
ure, and not from the same office, under the immediate supervision
o f the firm's peer review team captain and ultimate supervision by a
QCIC task force. The POB has cautioned the QCIC that great pains
need be taken to reduce the perception problem that this form o f
special review could cause, that is, that the reviewers will not b e ob
jective. Consequently the QCIC has agreed not to use either peer
reviewer or firm personnel in any situation where their involvem ent
in the previous peer review or last inspection would lead to a ques
tion about their objectivity. When such a question arises, the special
review should be conducted by a completely independent review team.
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At the time o f this writing, the QCIC is experimenting with a spe
cial review process that balances objectivity and cost concerns by
utilizing the following principles:
1.

No m em ber o f a special review team should review or opine on
work or matters on which that m em ber has already reviewed or
opined.

2.

All m em bers o f a review team must be com petent and qualified.

3.

Special review procedures must be specifically designed to ac
complish the purpose o f the review.

4.

Ultimate responsibility for the quality o f special reviews rests with
the QCIC.

Appropriate Bases for Sanctions
When the SIC Organizational Document was revised to incorporate
the Chetkovich Committee recommendations in 1984, an important
change concerned the matter o f sanctions. The Chetkovich Commit
tee formally recognized the dominance o f remedy over punishment
in the work o f the Special Investigations Committee. The revised
document m ade it clear that circumstances would rarely be encoun
tered when the SIC would recommend that the Executive Committee
sanction a firm. The possibility, o f course, was provided for but would
likely stem only from a firm's refusal to cooperate in any o f several
ways:
1.

Failure to provide information to the committee.

2.

Refusal to undergo a special review as ordered or to pay for one.

3.

Failure to take corrective action that is deem ed reasonable and
necessary by the committee.
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Increased A ccess for the Quality Control Inquiry
Com m ittee
Th e revised Organizational D ocum ent also reco g n ized the
com m ittee's need for information m ore directly relevant to the alle
gations in the litigation reported to the committee. As suggested pre
viously, som e committee members were more aggressive and perhaps
m ore effective in asking m em ber firm representatives the kinds o f
questions that brought forth useful answers. Such questions sometimes
went directly to the allegations in the case. Because there was no
requirement that the firms respond to such questions, som etim es
the com m ittee m em bers received responses to such questions and
som etim es they did not.
Members o f the com m ittee felt that they were at a severe disad
vantage in being totally dependent on the voluntary provision o f in
formation they needed. Relevant to this point, the Chetkovich Com
m ittee report recom m ended somewhat ambiguously that m em ber
firms "...should be required to furnish sufficient information (but not
the working papers or other direct evidence in a specific case)..."
The revised Organizational Document included the following:
Consideration of the nature and implications of the allegations ...
which may involve meetings with representatives o f the firm to
discuss the allegations made, the quality control policies and
procedures presently in effect, the corrective actions, if any, that
have been taken by the firm, and the results o f regular or special
inspections undertaken by the firm.

This revision strengthened the com m ittee's freedom to ask questions
related to the case before it, a substantial improvement from the early
days o f the com m ittee when such questions would likely have been
rejected. Nevertheless, this did not provide the com m ittee with as
much access to information about the case at hand as som e members
o f the com m ittee thought they needed to perform their task expedi
tiously and equitably to all m em ber firms. Consequently, the evolu
tion in com m ittee access to "case specific" information was not to
stop here.
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Increased Scope o f QCIC's Jurisdiction
A major recommendation in the Chetkovich report was introduced
as follows:
...we believe it is time to reconsider the requirement that only
litigation involving SEC registrants be reported.
A quality control deficiency that results in an audit failure relating
to a client that is not an SEC registrant could, in the absence of
some additional special safeguards, have the same result in con
nection with the audit o f an SEC registrant. The committee, in the
past, has added to its agenda a limited number of cases involving
entities that are not SEC registrants. Because of the construction
of the reporting requirement, it was found necessary in such in
stances to approach the firms involved and encourage them to
report such matters voluntarily.
Although that approach worked in those instances, the efficacy of
the process and the public credibility it obtains would be enhanced
if the reporting requirement was broadened. Ideally, it could be
argued that all alleged audit failures should be reported; however,
since the primary thrust of the SECPS relates to the improvement
of the quality of practice before the SEC, we conclude that the
requirement should be broadened to include cases involving en
tities, that although not SEC registrants, are of such interest to the
general and financial public that a distinction between them and
SEC registrants should not be made.

The recommendation reads as follows:
The membership requirement for reporting cases to the Special
Investigations Committee should be extended to cover cases in
volving all entities in which there is a significant public interest.

This recommendation was implemented in the revised Organiza
tional Document with these words:
The committee may identify a significant public interest in an al
leged audit failure that is not required to be reported to the com
mittee. The executive committee shall determine what actions, if
any, shall be taken by the Section with respect to such matters.

That recommendation was also reflected in the membership re
quirements as a "redefinition" o f an SEC client. The revised definition
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recognized the substantial public interest in the quality o f audits o f
banks, savings and loan institutions, and som e other entities that do
not file with the SEC. As noted previously, som e cases o f this type
had been voluntarily reported to the SIC. The revised requirement
called for reporting cases that allege failure to audit properly the fi
nancial statements o f a bank or other lending institution that periodi
cally files with a regulatory body and m eets certain size tests.
In June 1989, concern for the public interest led the SECPS Ex
ecutive Committee to grant the QCIC the right to inquire into litiga
tion initiated against auditors by regulators alleging audit failure in
the conduct o f an audit o f any financial institution. This further ex
pansion o f the QCIC process recognized that a significant number o f
complaints, particularly involving failed S & L's were being filed by
regulators which were not reportable to the QCIC even under the re
definition.

The Continuing Search for Credibility
Credibility is a combination o f an appropriate and well defined
mission, a good program to accomplish that mission, and actual per
form ance subject to independent review or testing. Because o f the
possibility o f serious damage to m em ber firms' litigation defenses,
the work o f the Quality Control Inquiry Committee is highly confiden
tial. This makes obtaining general credibility for the QCIC difficult in
deed. What people know nothing about is unlikely to impress them
as credible. So an effort has been made to establish credibility for the
QCIC in another way. If the SEC, an objective and independent body,
can test the activities o f the QCIC and find they perform ed satisfacto
rily, then the SEC's endorsement o f the QCIC's activities may provide
adequate credibility. In effect, SEC's endorsement has assumed the
status o f public credibility.
In May 1985, at the urging o f the POB, the Section agreed that
the activities o f the Special Investigations Committee should b e re
ported to the SEC with the POB staff acting as intermediary. In a ma
jo r departure from the Section's policy on confidentiality, this pro
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posal gave the SEC staff information about each case including iden
tification o f the audit firm and the audit client. For each case the SEC
staff received a summary o f (a) the major allegations, (b) the investi
gative procedures applied by the committee, (c) the results thereby
obtained, and (d) any subsequent actions o f the committee (the "closed
case summary"). The SEC staff was also given access to the POB's
com pleted oversight checklist and the POB staff m ade itself available
to respond candidly to SEC staff questions about the QCIC's actions
and findings and the POB's oversight.
The first such access by the SEC staff was provided from June 30
to July 2, 1986 when the SEC staff reviewed 24 closed case summa
ries and discussed those cases with the POB staff. From the stand
point o f relations with the SEC staff, this session marked a new level.
Questions were wide-ranging but relevant and responses were can
did.
Even though this first exchange o f information had been a sig
nificant departure from earlier positions taken, it was not sufficient
for the SEC staff to endorse the QCIC process. Yet the SEC staff now
had observed at first hand that the special investigative program was
one o f substance and quality.

SEC Reluctance to Endorse the Process
The SEC staff expressed three concerns about the QCIC process
subsequent to this first access experience. First, the SEC staff ques
tioned whether the QCIC's credibility could ever be established if it
focused solely on remedial measures to the exclusion o f punitive
considerations. Second, the SEC staff thought that the QCIC needed
to have access to selected workpapers o f the audits under litigation
to evaluate the effectiveness o f applicable quality controls and com 
pliance with them. Third, the QCIC should lower its threshold for per
form ing special reviews, especially when questions arise concerning
the quality o f work o f the auditors responsible for the audits in ques
tion.
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Soon thereafter, the members o f the POB m et in open session
with the SEC commissioners. Among the matters discussed was the
role o f the Special Investigations Committee, the fact that it did not
yet have the endorsement o f the SEC, and the paucity o f publicly
available information about SIC operations and accomplishments.
During the meeting, SEC Chairman John Shad expressed his opinion
that the SIC's credibility was crucial to determ ining whether the
profession's self-regulatory program was effective. He urged the Sec
tion and the POB to find a way to inform the public about the role and
operation o f the SIC.
Commissioner Peters urged that the SIC be given access to m ore
information about specific alleged audit failures to further assure its
effectiveness in improving the quality o f audits perform ed by Section
members. It was clear from the general tone o f the m eeting that these
were matters o f som e urgency. The POB agreed to exercise its best
efforts to im prove the disclosure o f SIC/QCIC activities, especially to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and also to gain for the
QCIC m ore direct information about alleged audit failures.

Som e Com plexities in the Credibility Issue
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee's credibility problem must
be seen as a mix o f variables, each o f which can be view ed from
different and not unreasonable points o f view. To be accepted as a
valid part o f the self-regulatory process, the QCIC had to establish its
effectiveness in serving the public interest. The im posed requirement
o f confidentiality made evaluation o f the QCIC's work by ''outsiders''
impossible. What did the QCIC do? Only the insiders knew. How well
did it perform? Only the insiders had direct access to QCIC activities.
The procedure for reporting and discussing closed case summaries
was designed to provide an adequate understanding o f both the QCIC's
activities and the quality o f its work to the SEC staff. The SEC staff
found it an improvement but initially at least not totally satisfactory
for the purpose.
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Yet stripping the QCIC o f confidentiality to provide the SEC staff
with m ore detail could expose the firms to risks in litigation that they
considered totally unacceptable. The continuing advice o f legal coun
sel could not be ignored.
The QCIC continues to face more than one interpretation o f its
function. A regulatory point o f view tends to emphasize identification
and punishment o f those who fail their duties. As one critic o f the
QCIC expressed it: "That's what regulators do." And the QCIC is the
only elem ent in the SEC Practice Section's program that deals with
allegations o f audit failure. If it fails to identify and punish, who will?
How can the QCIC then be accepted as an important link in the selfregulatory process if it never identifies or punishes anyone as a wrong
doer?
But as noted previously, the mem bers o f the SEC Practice Sec
tion have a different view o f the role o f the self-regulatory program.
They contend that the program best serves the public interest by go
ing directly to weaknesses in the quality control systems o f m em ber
firms and eliminating those weaknesses. Ho one else can do that as
well as they. But others — the legal system and legally supported
regulators — are both better equipped and better able to carry out
the "identify and punish" aspects o f regulation.
There are also strikingly different views on the cost o f the selfregulatory program. Regulators tend to have little interest in cost, es
pecially costs that do not impinge on their own budgets. Practitioners
have a vital interest in cost. Anything that increases their cost o f op
erations must be borne either by clients or reduce partner profits,
either o f which poses serious problems. The minimum costs o f the
self-regulatory program are considerable: peer reviews, second part
ner reviews on all SEC client audits, annual internal inspection pro
grams, and special reviews. The prospect o f incurring costs in self
regulation that may result in sustaining losses from litigation is both
ironic and remarkably unappealing.
Finally, professional pride is a matter o f no small consequence.
Regulators have little inhibition about calling for additional require
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ments to protect the public. What could be more important? Their
investigations into alleged and real misdeeds convince them o f the
necessity o f those requirements. Practitioners, on the other hand, see
them selves as serving faithfully and effectively in an honorable and
useful activity. The overw helm ing majority o f them have served
throughout their careers without ever having been charged with audit
failure. They and their firms have a responsibility to m eet client needs
at reasonable cost. How much o f this expensive self-regulation is really
needed?

Public O versight Board Interest in QCIC Credibility
The Public Oversight Board has a keen interest in the matter o f
QCIC credibility. In the first place, any weakness in QCIC credibility
raises questions about the entire self-regulatory program. The QCIC
was proposed and is recognized as necessary to supplement the peer
review process. The review o f engagements in a peer review is per
form ed on a sampling basis. If enough bad cases occur in spite o f
peer review, and if nothing is done about them, then peer review will
be found unsatisfactory.
Second, the QCIC was not patterned on any existing professional
model. Rather it was an innovation which the POB has supported en
thusiastically. The POB and the profession's leadership both recog
nized that a self-regulatory program that omitted review o f alleged
audit failures would not be accepted by Congress and other critics.
QCIC activities were not in the nature o f a normal practitioner
response. Peer review was sufficiently similar to internal inspection
programs to be understandable and accepted. Special investigation
activity smacked o f outside interference, regulation, and building a
case against the firm. The POB sees a real need for the QCIC to suc
ceed. At the same time, the POB has no desire to increase the litigation
risk to m em ber firms unreasonably.
Also, the Board feels pressure from both the Securities and Ex
change Commission and from m em ber firms to bring this issue to a
satisfactory resolution. The subject o f QCIC credibility is always on
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the agenda when the Board meets with the Commission. Likewise, it
also is a subject frequently discussed when the Board m eets with the
Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section or the AICPA Board
o f Directors.

POB Efforts to Resolve the Credibility Issue
Partly to help resolve the QCIC credibility issue and partly through
its general oversight activities, the Public Oversight Board generated
three proposals w e believe bear positively on the matter o f QCIC
credibility.

The Concept o f Incremental Risk. First, and primarily the result
o f a staff effort, the concept o f incremental risk was proposed and
investigated. We have already noted the great concern o f m em ber
firms and their counsels regarding possible prejudice to the firms in
litigation. Class action suits, joint and several liability, RICO and the
generally litigious environment in which accounting firms serve com 
bine to make allegations o f audit failure difficult to defend. Informa
tion obtained through any investigatory activities o f the QCIC may be
found useful by plaintiffs attorneys. "Why should we make their case
for them?" is the way one managing partner expressed his views.
With full understanding o f this strongly held view, the POB staff
raised an interesting question. Given the fact that rules o f discovery
and the admissibility o f evidence provide certain conditions within
which plaintiff constructs a case, how much would the risk o f failure
to successfully defend against that case be increased by giving the
QCIC som e limited access to information about the case?
Would plaintiff have access to QCIC documents? Would that ac
cess provide any help to plaintiff not already provided by com plete
access to the audit workpapers for the case and depositions o f audit
engagem ent personnel? Could QCIC m embers be forced to testify?
Would they be required to offer opinions on fault if their investigation
ran only to the possibility o f systemic design or compliance deficien
cies and not to fault in performance o f the audit?
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Expert research and advice were sought and obtained. The ques
tion o f a public policy exception was explored. Grounds for the ex
ception were that the self-regulatory program o f the profession could
not operate without the cooperation o f m ember firms who likely would
not provide information to the QCIC which could be discovered and
used at trial against them. The calling o f expert witnesses and the fact
that anything QCIC mem bers could derive from audit workpapers
would already be available from other sources was also inquired into.
The result o f this research provided no final answer. Too many o f
the questions are subject to broad judicial discretion or have not yet
been litigated. Although those involved, both litigators and non
litigators, were willing to express informed opinions, as lawyers they
were experienced enough to emphasize that what w e received were
opinions only with no assurance o f ultimate vindication.
Yet the concept o f incremental risk itself was useful in helping to
get the problem into perspective and in increasing the understanding
o f those concerned.
In the final analysis, with adoption o f the QCIC program, m em 
ber firms accepted the risk that QCIC conclusions and any corrective
actions required thereby may be subject to discovery. Thus, expansion
o f QCIC's investigative process to encom pass review o f selected
workpapers or interview o f engagement personnel would represent,
as counsel noted, "only a change in degree o f potential risk" to SECPS
firms.
Proposalfo r a More Structured Approach fo r the QCIC. The cases
reported to the QCIC by m em ber firms in compliance with the Sec
tion membership requirements vary significantly from the vague to
the specific, from highly visible to relatively unimportant, and from
com plex to straightforward. The QCIC investigation o f those cases
varies with the aggressiveness, experience, and ingenuity o f the QCIC
m em ber assigned to the case and with the responsiveness o f the
m em ber firm.
The crucial question in every case is when to close. At what point
and based on what evidence should the com m ittee conclude that
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further investigation is not warranted. In theory, the answer to that
question is: when the committee concludes that no corrective action
needs to be taken regarding the firm's quality controls or the compli
ance o f its personnel with those controls. Yet because o f the variety
o f cases and o f investigative approaches, som e unevenness between
cases is difficult to avoid.
Observation by the POB staff o f QCIC action in dealing with ap
proximately 200 reported cases convinced the staff that QCIC activity
could be improved and cases could be given more even treatment if
a m ore structured and positive approach were adopted.
The structure was provided by a sequence o f procedures, each
one leading logically to the next:
Analysis
Inquiry
Investigative procedures
Special review
Analysis comprehended a reading o f the allegations, the financial
statements to which they relate, and any other material readily avail
able to determ ine if the plaintiff's charges are sufficiently specific and
relevant to have quality control implications. If not, a recommenda
tion for closing the case was in order.
Inquiry provided for direct contact with the m em ber firm to seek
answers to questions raised by the quality control implications found
in the analysis phase. Questions might run to whether the audit in
question had been included in the most recent peer review and in
spection programs, how the firm felt about the allegations, the firm's
risk evaluation o f the client, and similar matters. If responses to these
questions could allay the QCIC m em ber's concerns about quality
control, a recommendation for closing the case was in order; otherwise
the case would be held open and subjected to investigative procedures.
Investigative procedures involved further inquiries more directly
related to the case and the qualifications o f the audit team, discussion
with the peer reviewers, examination o f inspection reports, reading
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available regulatory reports, following up on questions raised by the
media, and the like.
The investigation phase com es to a conclusion when the QCIC
m em ber assigned to the case recommends either that the case be
closed or that a special review be undertaken. When a case has been
carried this far, the other m embers o f the com m ittee have becom e
familiar with it and the task force's recommendation will be the sub
je c t o f com prehensive com m ittee discussion.
Special reviews might be directed to other engagements by per
sonnel who supervised the allegedly faulty audit, to selected engage
ments in the same industry on an office or firm-wide basis, to engage
m ents with unique transactions, to a review o f quality control
compliance by one or more offices, or to a review o f the entire system
(a peer review).
The positive elem ent in pursuing this structured approach is one
o f attitude. The task force assigned to the case continues with the
current or next step in the process until satisfied that there is nothing
to be gained by continuing further. That is, the evidence available is
sufficient to persuade him that nothing significant is to be accom 
plished in the way o f public protection by continuing the inquiry.

Discussion with House Counsels. The third contribution by the
FOB to resolve the issue o f QCIC credibility was a roundtable discus
sion o f that issue with the house counsels o f a number o f the larger
m em ber firms called by the chairman o f the Public Oversight Board.
He felt that a frank discussion with these people, whose advice to the
chief executive officers o f the member firms carried such weight, would
be enlightening to all concerned. The response was encouraging.
Ho record or minutes o f any kind were kept. The discussion was
frank and open. Concerns were considered and the concept o f incre
mental risk was explained and discussed. The importance o f QCIC
credibility, a matter not likely to com e to the attention o f the house
counsels, was also explained and discussed at length. The house
counsels made no secret o f their determination to protect their firms
from unnecessary litigation risks. They saw that as a first responsibil
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ity. At the same time, they indicated an appreciation for the impor
tance o f a self-regulatory program that made additional regulation un
necessary. The subject o f QCIC access to selected audit workpapers
for cases under investigation was discussed at som e length.
No action was taken at the meeting nor was any anticipated. A
frank airing o f views was deem ed to b e useful. There is little doubt
that all present departed with a fuller understanding o f the dangers
that others saw in the various courses o f action discussed.

Chapter 7
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE
PROCESS
The R ossi Task Force
As a result o f its meeting with the Securities and Exchange Com 
mission on July 29, 1986, the POB requested the SEC Practice Sec
tion to reconsider (1) providing the QCIC access to selected audit
workpapers and (2) relaxing the confidentiality surrounding its activi
ties in order to strengthen QCIC's effectiveness and credibility. The
Section responded in Septem ber o f that year by appointing a task
force to review QCIC methodology. The chairman, Frank Rossi, was
join ed on the task force by a fellow SEC Practice Section Executive
Committee member, two QCIC members, and the general counsels
o f two firms.
The task force m et with representatives o f a number o f firms
having large SEC practices, the Chief Accountant o f the SEC and his
staff, representatives o f the POB, and m embers o f the SIC/QCIC. On
April 3, 1987, the task force issued its report, "Enhancing the Effec
tiveness and Credibility o f the SIC Activities."
The SEC Practice Section's Executive Committee accepted the
task force's report at a special meeting in April 1987. The m ajor con
clusions included the following:
•

The mission o f the com m ittee should not be changed; it should
continue to com plem ent the peer review process by evaluating
the quality control implications o f alleged audit failures.

•

The com m ittee should adopt a more structured approach in act
ing on reported cases.

•

QCIC task forces should be permitted to access, when appropri
ate, selected audit documentation prepared in the course o f per
form ing the audit in question.

•

The SEC should be provided with m ore meaningful reports o f the
actions and findings o f the com m ittee on reported cases.
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QCIC representatives should m eet periodically with the SEC Chief
Accountant and mem bers o f his staff to enhance the SEC's gen
eral understanding o f the com m ittee's activities.

R esults o f the Task Force's Recom m endations
In June 1987, the Executive Committee m odified the QCIC Or
ganizational Document with the following additions:
I.

The following provision was added to paragraph 17 in the sec
tion entitled "Investigative Procedures:" T h e SIC, when it deem s
it appropriate and necessary, should read audit documentation,
such as audit planning memoranda, summary review memoranda,
audit issues memoranda, or consultation memoranda, that could
enable the SIC to evaluate whether appropriate attention was
given by appropriate individuals during the audit to the issues
addressed by the allegations.’2However, while access should be
sufficient for the SIC to evaluate whether the m em ber firm had
suitable quality controls and whether they were operating effec
tively, the SIC's review should not be so extensive as to place it
in a position to determine whether or not the firm had specifi
cally com plied with generally accepted auditing standards in the
area under consideration. The exact extent, nature, and form o f
access requested depends on the individual circumstances pre
sented by the specific case and the specific allegations.

II.

The next paragraph o f the aforementioned section was amended
to read as follows:

2A m ember firm will ordinarily evaluate the litigation risk against the benefit of
permitting the SIC access on a specific case. Accordingly, a decision not to permit
access to documentation does not necessarily mean that inappropriate attention
was given to a matter. That decision would not, in and o f itself, cause the SIC to
recommend the imposition of sanctions, provided the firm's decision was not a
general refusal to cooperate. The inability to review important evidence of quality
controls would likely result in a more extensive investigation than would otherwise
be required, including the greater likelihood of a special review. Furthermore, a
general refusal to cooperate in the investigative process would cause the SIC to
recommend sanctions.
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A firm is required to cooperate with the com m ittee by furnishing
on a timely basis, upon request, the information contemplated
by paragraph 17 and by authorizing its peer reviewers to comply
with requests for such information. A firm is also ordinarily ex
pected to cooperate with requests to permit SIC access, when
appropriate, to certain audit documentation bearing upon the
m em ber firm's awareness and consideration o f the issues ad
dressed by allegations made against the firm. However, a firm is
not required to provide the com m ittee or its representative with
information that would invade the attorney-client privilege, or with
the litigation work product o f the firm or any o f its partners or
employees.

Adoption o f Working Procedures. The QCIC has adopted working
procedures that include implementation o f the more structured and
positive approach initially proposed by the FOB staff and included in
the Rossi Task Force recommendations.

Access to Selected Audit Workpapers Has Been Requested and
Provided. Since the revisions to the Organizational Document were
made, the QCIC has requested and was provided access to selected
workpapers as part o f its investigative procedures on numerous cases.
Ho instance o f outright refusal by a firm to provide such access on
request has been encountered.
Developm ent o f Closed Case Summaries. Since July 1986, when
the SEC staff had access for the first tim e to closed case summaries
and the opportunity to discuss the cases with the POB staff, they have
done so nine times and have reviewed in the process approximately
180 summaries. As with other aspects o f the QCIC process, the detail
o f the committee's considerations and conclusions on individual cases
as contained in the closed case summaries prepared by AICPA staff
m embers has evolved.
Early attempts at such summaries were described as o f little use
by SEC staff m em bers who were quick to observe that their only basis
for evaluating the QCIC's action on individual cases was the "case
summary." In their opinion, the summary provided too little informa-
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tion to enable them to meaningfully pose challenging questions for
the purpose o f evaluating the SIC process.
Continuing efforts to expand the summaries were m et with criti
cism by the firms involved and their house counsels. At times, those
involved in preparing the summaries were near despair concerning
the prospects o f satisfying both the firms and the SEC staff. The Rossi
Task Force recom m ended in April 1987 expanding the closed case
summaries to describe the specific issues considered by the QCIC,
including the attention given to relevant SEC pronouncements, and
to indicate the types o f audit documentation reviewed, interviews
conducted, decisions (if any) not to permit access to requested infor
mation and the basis for the QCIC's conclusions. As a result, although
the format o f the summary remained the same, the degree o f detail
expanded over the next two years o f SEC staff access. By Septem ber
1989, the SEC staff had noted a major improvement in the informa
tion provided them and indicated a willingness to enter into a dia
logue with officials o f the SECPS and the POB concerning possible
endorsement.
That month, an SECPS task force proposal to make the closed
case summary an even m ore informative document for SEC staff
oversight was accepted by the SECPS Executive Committee. The "new
summary" would m ore clearly explain the QCIC action on a case in a
five-step format:
•

Background information on the registrant

•

Litigation

•

Summary o f allegations

•

QCIC procedures and conclusions

•

Decision to close case.

The allegations o f a case were to b e specifically related to quality
control issues to avoid any implication that the com m ittee was ad
dressing the merits o f the allegations per se. The result would be a
slightly expanded risk in litigation to m em ber firms if the summary
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were discoverable by plaintiff's bar. Recognizing, however, that the
summary would only be retained for thirty days from the date the SEC
staff was notified o f its availability, the risk was deem ed not inordi
nate, and was worth taking to obtain the SEC's endorsement o f the
process. Such endorsement would add immeasurably to the credibility
o f the process.
In February 1990, the SEC staff reviewed thirty-one case summa
ries in the new format and discussed them with POB and Institute
staffs. In March 1990, SEC Chief Accountant Coulson and his staff
m et with SECPS officials and POB representatives to provide the staff's
reactions to the new summary. The SEC staff's reaction was most
positive. Based on the information provided, the staff had concluded
that the QCIC process provides added assurance, as a supplement to
the peer review process, that major quality control deficiencies in the
SECPS mem bers firms’ quality control systems, if any, are identified
and delivered in a m ore timely fashion.
Sharing the SEC staff's convictions concerning the importance
o f "internal reviews" perform ed by firms which focus on possible
"people problem s" (see SEC Views on Special Reviews and "Internal"
Reviews on page 45), the Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice
Section in Septem ber 1990 approved a procedure recom m ended by
the QCIC and endorsed by the POB whereby a firm would be requested
in certain cases to perform a timely inspection o f audits o f specific
personnel whose work has been alleged in litigation to be substan
dard. This possibility would exist when QCIC analysis and in-depth
inquiry leave open the possibility that engagement personnel may
not have fully com plied with their firm's system o f quality control.
The decision to request such an inspection would be one m ade by
the entire QCIC after taking into account the information the committee
has gathered through the application o f its investigative procedures.
The com m ittee will explain in the closed case summary the consider
ation it gave to invoking this new procedure whenever a case is closed
in the investigative (in-depth inquiry) phase.
In addition, the POB is considering an SEC staff request to pro
vide m ore narrative information concerning its oversight o f QCIC ac
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tivity on individual cases in its oversight workpapers which are acces
sible to the SEC staff. Before reaching a decision, the Board is care
fully weighing the SEC's need for such documentation to evaluate the
process and the possible adverse effect such documentation might
have on the m em ber firms' rights concerning their legal defenses.

Chapter 8
CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE QUALITY
CONTROL INQUIRY COMMITTEE
A s Seen by the POB
A review o f the documentary evidence showing the evolution o f
the QCIC during its ten years o f activity plus an intimate acquaintance
with its activity and procedures lead to the following conclusions.
1.

The com m ittee has com e a long way; it serves a useful and vital
role in the self-regulatory process.

2.

It has not exceeded reasonable use o f the powers extended to it.

3.

M em ber firm s have, s o m e very reluctantly, in creased the
com m ittee's powers from time to time until these far exceed
anything contemplated at the time o f its establishment.

4.

Based on the extent and quality o f its work, the QCIC has earned
credibility as an essential and effective part o f the self-regulatory
program. Endorsement by the SEC is certainly desirable but in
no way essential to its importance and effectiveness.

The success o f the QCIC lies in its emphasis on the public inter
est in improving audit service through the elimination o f quality con
trol deficiencies and identification o f professional standards which
need reconsideration. It has wisely avoided the task for which it is not
adequately qualified or well designed, the identification o f fault and
imposition o f punishment, although it has not hesitated to recom 
mend investigation o f the work o f specific individuals by the AICPA's
Professional Ethics Division. A review o f a summary o f the results o f
QCIC activity in carefully considering the implications o f 349 cases
from inception, Novem ber 1, 1979, through June 30, 1990, amply
demonstrates the vital role that the com m ittee has com e to play in
the self-regulatory program.
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Results o f SIC/QCIC Activity
Number o f Actions
ACTIONS RELATED TO FIRMS
A special review was made or the firm's
regularly scheduled peer review was expan ded........

38

The firm took appropriate corrective measures
that were responsive to the implications o f the
specific c a s e ................................................................

53

ACTIONS RELATED TO STANDARDS
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies w ere asked
to consider the need for changes in, or
additional guidance on, professional
standards......................................................................

36

ACTIONS RELATED TO INDIVIDUALS
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional
Ethics Division with a recommendation for an
investigation into the work o f specific individuals ....

14
141

Note: Frequently, m ore than one action is taken by the QCIC or the
firm in a single case.

The Public Oversight Bo ard has repeatedly com plim ented the
Quality Control Inquiry Committee on the quality o f its performance
o f an important and difficult task. But quality and credibility differ.
Many important and difficult tasks are perform ed valiantly without
public notice or recognition. So it is with the QCIC. Operating as it
must in com plete confidentiality, there is no opportunity for the public
to learn o f its work or to grant the QCIC the credibility it deserves.
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A s Seen by the M em ber Firms
Member firms tend to see the QCIC as a latent threat and a very
real concern. The hazards o f practice in a litigious environment un
avoidably make firm management and in-house counsel reluctant to
participate in any effort, however worthy, that might increase litiga
tion risk. Because QCIC activities are confidential, few mem bers o f
any firm have direct knowledge o f the quality and nature o f QCIC
personnel or activities. Questions such as why certain information is
needed, how it will b e used, and what precautions are taken to keep
it confidential, if asked, can seldom be answered in specific terms.
Hence there is a natural reluctance on the part o f the firms to volun
teer information. On the contrary, the general feeling is that the less
w e have to do with the QCIC, the better. A constant fear exists that
the com m ittee may fail to see the danger to a defendant firm in the
information that has com e to its attention.

A s Seen by the SEC S taff
An SEC staff member, concerned with regulation, is unlikely to
have great enthusiasm for confidentiality and the destruction o f
records. Full and fair disclosure o f all information obtained, no limi
tation on questions that might be asked or leads that might be pursued,
and a deemphasis on the audit firm's interests compared with the
public interest are expected. How is the SEC staff to know whether
the QCIC personnel asked all the questions they should have asked,
pursued every lead to a satisfactory conclusion, and overlooked no
possibilities o f deficient auditing?

A Reconciliation o f Views
Given these different points o f view, one need not be surprised
that the SEC has had difficulty in "endorsing" the QCIC process.
Through the efforts o f the SEC Practice Section and the POB, originally
expressed concerns about this process were eliminated. The value o f
a QCIC whose vision was focused on remedial rather than punitive
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measures becam e clearer to the SEC. The granting to the QCIC by the
Executive Committee o f the right to access selected audit documen
tation relating to audits under litigation eliminated still another con
cern o f the Commission about the effectiveness o f the com m ittee's
process. Finally, the lowering o f the threshold for special reviews in
combination with the recently adopted procedure for the conduct o f
"internal reviews" by m em ber firms at the QCIC's req u est when
questions arise concerning the quality o f work o f the auditors respon
sible for the audits in question, has virtually eliminated another o f the
SEC's concerns. (See SEC Reluctance to Endorse the Process on page
50.)
Information contained in 180 closed case summaries, which have
recently been expanded in information content, has persuaded the
SEC staff that firms have taken quality control corrective actions in
response to QCIC recommendations including transfer, termination
and remedial training o f personnel. The SEC staff is also aware that
professional standards have been im proved as a result o f QCIC rec
ommendations.
Because the QCIC deals with sensitive litigation matters that re
quire strict confidentiality, it has been difficult to reach an accom m o
dation with the SEC Chief Accountant's office in a way that respects
both the concerns o f m em ber firms and the Chief Accountant's need
for information. Thus it is truly significant that the Chief Accountant
o f the SEC has indicated that his staff has received sufficient informa
tion to conclude that the QCIC process provides added assurance, as
a supplement to the SECPS peer review program, that major quality
control deficiencies, if any, are identified and addressed in a more
timely fashion, and thus the QCIC process benefits the public inter
est.
In our view, both the QCIC and the SEC staff are to be com 
m ended for the diligence with which each has pursued its goals. The
two organizations have different purposes and these are pursued in
different ways. Neither can substitute for the other. Both are necessary.
Based on our own rather intimate experience with QCIC personnel
and activities, we have no reluctance in citing it as a remarkable and
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remarkably effective effort by the members o f the SEC Practice Sec
tion to provide the public with the quality o f service that the public
deserves. Would that all professions might do as well.

APPENDIX
INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SERVED ON THE
QUALITY CONTROL INQUIRY COMMITTEE
From Inception Through June 30, 1990
Period o f Service
Thomas E. Byrne, Jr.

1987-Present

David C. Cargill

1990-Present

Mark J. Feingold

1980-1986

Edwin P. Fisher

1979-1985

Mario J. Formichella

1986-Present

Robert E. Fleming

1985-Present

John J. Fox
James L. Goble
Gerald E. Gorans
William D. Hall, Chairman 1987-Present

1983-1988
1987-Present
1983-1987
1987-Present

John G. Henderson

1985-1987

Joseph Herbst

1985-1987

Thomas B. Hogan

1980-1983

George M. Horn

1985-Present

James I. Konkel

1989-Present

Harry L. Laing

1979-1983

Rholan E. Larson, Chairman 1979-1981

1979-1981

Leroy Layton

1979-1985

Charles W. Maurer

1988-Present

Robert A. Mellin, Chairman 1981-1987

1981-1987

J. David Moxley

1987-1988

Leon P. Otkiss

1979-1985

John B. O'Hara

1979-1983

Larry J. Parsons

1988-Present

Harry F. Reiss, Jr.

1979-1980

Lawrence J. Seidman

1979-1980

Fred S. Spindell

1990-Present

David Wentworth

1979-1985

Joseph A. Zulfer

1983-1988

